The eminent Harvard Law School professor Yochai Benkler wrote in 1999 that “We are in the midst of an enclosure movement in our information environment.” Benkler’s metaphor invokes the land enclosure movement of the 16th-18th centuries—in which formerly open (and, colloquially, “common”) fields in Britain were fenced and divided among private landholders. The metaphor is, as James Boyle notes, “too succulent to resist” by contemporary intellectual property commentators. In his article on this “Second Enclosure Movement,” Boyle teases the metaphor out into its various threads:

[T]he critics and proponents of enclosure are locked in battle, hurling at each other incommensurable claims about innovation, efficiency, traditional values, the boundaries of the market, the saving of lives, the loss of familiar liberties. Once again, opposition to enclosure is portrayed as economically illiterate; the beneficiaries of enclosure telling us that an expansion of property rights is needed in order to fuel progress. (Boyle 2003: 41)

In early modern Britain, the enclosures fenced off commonly used grazing lands. But our contemporary notion of the “commons” has been shaped in response to the enclosure movement: a reflection on a local political and economic milieu brought into sharp relief by the imposition of enforced property laws. The ensuing debates over land enclosures pitted the goods brought about by encouraging private investment in and improvement of private land against the traditional good of access to common pastureland as a public resource. Since then, the discursive and even legal entity of the commons has been employed to make a variety of political and economic points (not least of which Garrett Hardin’s now-infamous 1968 “Tragedy of the Commons”). The terms we use to talk about such issues are themselves products of the playing out of these debates. Similarly, the invocation of an intellectual, cultural or “creative”
commons is a response to the imposition of formerly non-existent or non-obvious property rights on new realms of our intellectual and cultural landscape. We are learning the new vocabulary as we go, as the law, economics, and day-to-day practices of the digital age shift under massive technological change.

A notable case in point is the recent shift of the domain of copyright law from its original role as state regulation of industrial printing—a means of ensuring fair competition—to its contemporary application in the fine control of individuals’ use of creative works. The Internet makes every act an act of copying; this is the nature of digital media. As the technical foundations upon which copyright has traditionally rested shift significantly from industrial manufacturing to personal and peer-to-peer engagement, individual uses begin to have real effects on existing business models. As such, representatives from affected industries have not surprisingly taken various steps to extend the reach of intellectual property protection into the digital realm, in the pursuit of stronger laws—and in construction of higher fences: the “technological protection measures” of contemporary legislation.

James Boyle’s historicizing of this “second enclosure movement” is in large part in the service of the public domain, itself a concept invoked and reified in discursive response to the growth of copyright legislation and jurisprudence. Beyond the negative definition of the public domain (consisting simply of those works for which the copyright term has expired), the positive conception of the public domain as something of considered value, deserving of public, and even constitutional, protection dates to as late as 1966 in the United States (Boyle 2003: 58). Boyle himself is co-founder of something called the “Institute for the Study of the Public Domain,” and as such is part of a larger movement to articulate the broader positive value to society of such a commons. In a rhetorical move drawn directly from the rise of the environmental movement, Boyle notes that, “like the environment, the public domain must be ‘invented’ before it is saved.”

Indeed now is the time to take the public domain seriously. This broad conception of an intellectual or cultural ‘ecology’ is not entirely new—such existing legal constructs as “fair dealing” and the American “fair use” have been long recognized for the balancing role they play in a larger ecology (in which copyright plays a dominant part). Fair dealing has been defined as a set of exemptions (or in the USA, an approach to exemptions) to the restrictions already coded in copyright law. As rights holders have sought greater and more detailed articulations of their legal protections, it is also necessary to define cases and scenarios that mark their reasonable limits. Where the public domain has been invoked to cover those areas of human expression where copyright protection is not or no longer justifiable, fair dealing and fair use exemptions
cover those contexts in which copyright-protected works ought to be accessible without requiring formal clearance. The canonical examples of research, private study, criticism, review, and news reporting all make more or less unproblematic sense when considered thus.

The trouble, as Lawrence Lessig (2004) has taken pains to elaborate, is that there is in our time a general movement in copyright reform toward greater and greater articulations of the reach of copyright protection—especially into the digital realm—at the expense of the sorts of public access previously thought of as “fair.” Hence the invocation of the “enclosure” metaphor, and the rise of a number of strategies to resist encroachment of stronger property laws and to develop alternative frameworks for understanding and articulating these issues. However, these tend to be rear-guard tactics as opposed to coherent strategic action, not surprising given the scope and scale of forces mobilized to maximize copyright protection.

There are a variety of such tactical approaches to resisting further enclosure, which seem to me to fall into two basic camps. The first is action on the level of copyright legislation and jurisprudence; this includes efforts to lobby for more liberal copyright laws, efforts to expand the scope of fair dealing, and/or to pursue these causes in court. The now famous *CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper Canada* (2004) case offers a notable example, helpfully expanding the discourse around how Fair Dealing can and indeed ought to be interpreted.

The second approach is to promote more explicit articulation of user rights in license agreements between the rights holder and end users. This approach arises from the groundbreaking work of the Free Software Foundation in the 1980s (see Stallmann 1985), and is now perhaps more popularly recognized in the widespread promotion of the *Creative Commons* (CC) licenses. Such approaches are typically said to be layered on top of existing copyright legislation, which has the ironic effect of presenting a rather conservative appeal to the original conception of copyright, while seeking more radical articulations of use and license.

**Negotiating ‘Gridlock’**

The broad public appear of such movements toward liberalization is in response to a growing spectre of copyright maximalism. Michael Heller’s popular book, *The Gridlock Economy* (2008), outlines the dangers of too much enclosure—a “tragedy of the anticommons” in which the problem of too many rights-holders prevents effective action because of the spiraling costs of negotiating and arranging rights clearance. Heller’s examples are largely drawn from dramatic
and widely recognized legal minefields as biomedical patent negotiation, real
estate development, and wireless spectrum regulation. Documentary filmmakers,
too, have often complained about the difficulties of navigating such a permissions
landscape. The basic point is broadly applicable to the role of copyright in our
contemporary intellectual and cultural landscape. Given a dense fabric of
properties and property rights, we face a chilling effect on use and reuse owing to
the high transaction costs of rights clearances.

As the landscape of intellectual property becomes more explicitly articulated and
monitored, we begin to see culture more as a matrix of restrictions and licenses
than ever before. Lessig (2004) notes that we have moved from a world in which
the vast majority of the uses of cultural works were unregulated to a world in
which almost all uses are regulated in one way or another, with exemptions like
fair use—and open licenses—providing only a thin layer of public access. Lessig’s
example lays out three realms of control:

In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated
uses that are nonetheless deemed “fair” regardless of the copyright
owner’s view. (Lessig 2004: 143)

Historically, Lessig argues, the first category of unregulated uses was dominant:
we were utterly free to read a book, write in its margins, give it to a friend, use it
as a doorstop, and so on. The formally regulated realm applied primarily to the
activities of printers and such industrial enterprises, and the “fair” exemptions
operated as a reasonable and practical limit on the regulated uses. But with the
advent of the Internet and digital media, where every act is an act of copying,
Lessig points out that “uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now
presumptively regulated.” In the world we live in today, practically all uses of
digital, networked cultural content are potentially regulated, with only a thin
layer of explicit exemptions. All works now have a formal legal rights status, even
those sitting openly on the World-Wide Web, even those released under an open
license. We are increasingly in a position of being forced to consider where any
particular use falls vis à vis that legal status. This is to note that the gridlock
scenario applies both where “all rights are reserved,” but also in an open
environment such as that promoted by the Creative Commons movement.

The danger is that we are headed towards a “total information awareness” model
of intellectual property rights, a world in which every piece of intellectual and
cultural material is explicitly owned and licensed and/or marketed, with
increasingly hefty and complex requirements for rights discovery, clearance, and
marketing; even in the case of so-called ‘free’ culture and ‘open’ access
movements. Consider the predicament of the Science Commons project, which
promotes open access to research data sets in the name of making scientific
endeavours both more efficient and more broadly accessible. Director John Wilbanks describes a potential gridlock scenario in the sciences, even in the context of a open data licenses, simply because of the basic need to declare rights and attribution information at every level:

In a world of database integration and federation, attribution can easily cascade into a burden for scientists if a category error is made. Would a scientist need to attribute 40,000 data depositors in the event of a query across 40,000 data sets? [...] Indeed, failing to give attribution to all 40,000 sources could be the basis for a copyright infringement suit at worst, and at best, imposes a significant transaction cost on the scientist using the data. (Wilbanks 2008: 3)

Even in an open project like Science Commons, where freedom of use and openness of information and technologies are central, the problem of formal rights status and proliferation of legal terms threatens the entire endeavour. The response of Science Commons, under Wilbanks’ direction, was to champion the “public domain as first recourse” (5) instead of open licenses for data sets. Interestingly, the Creative Commons has responded with a new ‘license’—CC0—which can be used as a “waiver” or an “assertion” of public domain status.

**One Ring to Rule Them All**

Many believe that the problems of transaction costs and related gridlock effects can be solved by digital media itself; an all-encompassing database listing the ownership, licensing, and market terms of all works will make it quick and easy to look up and determine the status of any particular work. Such a master database would let everyone know the status of everything, and would thus be invaluable in day-to-day digital transactions. Users searching for free or open-licensed works would be able to locate what they want, while those interested in pursuing rights clearance in a more commercial context would have a one-stop shopping opportunity. There already exist various private (and ‘public’) initiatives to create such a master database or rights clearing house. It is worthwhile for us to consider some of these carefully.

In 2002, the Department of Canadian Heritage announced the Electronic Copyright Fund, a $2.7 million initiative aimed at the development of “online copyright licensing systems.” The funds would allow Access Copyright, its French-language counterpart, and a third party RightsMarket, to create a master catalogue of rights. Access Copyright, the English Canadian agency which provides copyright licensing for photocopying and related institutional uses, is almost by definition enclosure-oriented. Access Copyright already maintains a
large voluntary database of works and encourages creators and publishers to register so that they can receive royalties “whenever we find your works copied under one of our licences” (Access Copyright website). Access Copyright’s role in distributing royalties from widespread institutional photocopying is by now a commonplace, and today the organization has its sights set on the online world, with the possibility of making its registry much more comprehensive. More recently, Access Copyright and Creative Commons Canada announced a similar registry of works in the public domain:

There is currently no one place where information about the public domain is collected. The registry will make published works in the Canadian public domain easily identifiable and accessible in an online catalogue. (Access Copyright 2006)

While no royalties would presumably be collected or paid for public domain works, such a registry clearly strengthens Access Copyright’s position of omniscience. In a digitally mediated economy, those who control the obligatory passage points (Callon 1986) of rights discovery and negotiation are in considerable positions of power. But of course, Access Copyright is but a small player in the game of omniscience. There is a much larger project which threatens to completely overshadow such endeavours.

The canonical example of such a master database is Google and its Book Search Program. In the Amended Settlement Agreement of November 2009, there are provisions for a “Book Rights Registry” and “Unclaimed Works Fiduciary,” somewhat at arms length from Google itself, which would play the role of master rights database. As Google’s ambition, and probably practical reach, is to index every book ever published (as well as every website), it is reasonable to see such a registry as the beginnings of a master rights index of all textual works—every text in the world.

Google is not alone. The Open Content Alliance, a “permanent archive of digitized work” set up by a consortium of organizations—including Yahoo, Microsoft, and the Internet Archive—in response to the unilateral agenda of Google’s book-scanning endeavour, distinguishes itself from the Google project in its openness—the OCA’s collection will be non-proprietary and “free to read” (OCA FAQ). But it too represents an attempt to create a comprehensive index of rights information, an index which we would be required to consult at every turn. A critic of the project, Kalev Leetaru wrote:

To determine the rights status of any particular work, a user must follow the link in both the Digitizing Sponsor and Book Contributor metadata fields to view the rights restrictions enforced by the two organizations. [...] Hence, the burden falls to the user to read and
legally interpret the rights statements of both entities before being able to determine the rights status of any particular work and whether a particular usage would be permitted. (Leetaru 2008)

The burden, of course, may not ultimately fall to the user, but to an agency which would take care of the rights navigation and negotiation on the user’s behalf—in the interests of streamlining the whole business, making it simpler and more efficient. But we should not be comforted by such a scenario.

Even the Creative Commons movement itself—taken to its logical conclusion—relies on the assumption that there is some queryable source that is the final word on what one can and cannot use in a particular situation. The Creative Commons organization forswears any ambition to create such a registry, but in the large, the universe of CC-licensed works—and especially the relationship of that set of works to the larger copyrighted world—practically presupposes such an index, though it may conceivably operate in decentralized fashion. The Creative Commons FAQ defers to the notion of the “Semantic Web” (Berners-Lee, Hendler, & Lassila 2001) to solve the practical problem; that the declarations made in metadata form an aggregate database, queryable at all times. And even more local- and commons-oriented initiatives are oriented to this such a telos. The ArtMob.ca project, which aims to “build large, accessible online archives of publicly licensed Canadian art” (ArtMob.ca), will similarly depend on a master database of what is and isn’t “publicly licensed.”

Here is the question that arises: if everything—even the so-called ‘free’ and ‘open’ works—is subject to some listing in a rights and access database, then how free is free? We do not appear to enjoy our freedom to the same degree as with the “unregulated uses” Lessig recalls from our pre-digital history. To extend Boyle’s “enclosure” analogy somewhat, despite the existence of free and open-licensed materials, everything is still fenced in. Some of the fenced-in plots may display a notice that says, “you are free to graze your cattle here,” but the fences themselves are an integral—perhaps the significant—feature of the landscape.

Lessig goes on to challenge us, asking if this is indeed the kind of world we want to live in—a world, he writes in his 2010 essay, “For the Love of Culture,” in which “every bit, every published word, could be licensed. It is the opposite of the old slogan about nuclear power: every bit gets metered, because metering is so cheap.”

Considering the Role of Authorship in the ‘Commons’

How we have come to this point relies in large part on deeply embedded
assumptions about authors and authorship. For copyright is not solely an
industrial regulation; the ideological and moral foundations of such intellectual
property laws are tied up in the Enlightenment’s conception of the author and the
inseparability of the author and his work. Most explicitly, this is captured in the
continental **droit d’auteur** notion, but centrality and inalienability of the author is
invoked and evoked repeatedly in the Anglo-American tradition (In Canadian
Law, the connection between author and work is formally protected in the “moral
rights” described in Section 14.1 of the Canadian Copyright Act.)

The “public domain,” in the quotidian sense as the *shadow* cast by the lamp of
copyright illustrates the centrality of authorship nicely: works in the public
domain are either formally “authorless” or those whose authors have been
divorced (by death and time) from their rights to the work. The public domain
has come to rest on a severance of the assumed connection between author and
work. It is that *abnormal* part of the landscape where the fences are down and
the grass unmown; the land nobody loves. As such, the public domain has proved
of little use in efforts to resist enclosure. Nearly all of the significant
free-licensing strategies—starting from the Free Software Foundation’s copyleft
approach (GNU GPL; Stallman 1985)—have rejected the public domain and
instead chosen to build ‘free’ and ‘open’ and ‘public’ access on a foundation of
copyright. There are, however, differing effects achieved by the various strategies.
It is instructive to examine copyleft (esp. the GNU General Public License), the
Creative Commons, and more restrictive licenses to see how differently they
render the relationship between authorship and legal control.

Where the public domain assumes—literally—the “death of the author,” the
Creative Commons (CC) shows him alive and kicking, making “attribution” the
most fundamental of the CC license components, the sole non-optional item. CC
licenses are customizable in a variety of ways; a licensor can restrict the users’
rights to redistribute commercially (“nc” or *non-commercial*) or to modify (“nd”
or *no-derivatives*), or to require that modified works inherit the same license
terms as the original (“sa” or *share-alike*, itself a copyleft approach). But the “by”
line remains the core of the CC license; to relinquish this is simply to consign
one’s work to the public domain. In this version of the teleological argument, if
there is a license, there must necessarily be a licensor, though there are in
practice a variety of ways of treating the attribution portion of a CC license: in
someone else’s name, or pseudonymously, or even anonymously (see Wikipedia’s
anonimity). This rhetorical centrality of the attribution component has
significant implications for the Creative Commons. In putting attribution first,
the Creative Commons assumes a modernist, author-centric world of “creative”
genius. This may put it rhetorically at odds with the very idea of a commons.

David Barrie & Gilles Moss note:
As a result, the Creative Commons network provides only a simulacrum of a commons. It is a commons without commonality. Under the name of the commons, we actually have a privatised, individuated and dispersed collection of objects and resources that subsist in a technical–legal space of confusing and differential legal restrictions, ownership rights and permissions. The Creative Commons network might enable sharing of culture goods and resources amongst possessive individuals and groups. But these goods are neither really shared in common, nor owned in common, nor accountable to the common itself. It is left to the whims of private individuals and groups to permit reuse. (Berrie & Moss 2005)

In contrast, the “copyleft” approach taken by the GNU General Public License (GPL)—and the CC’s share-alike license provision—puts authorship second to the license itself (and the public commons which is effected), and in doing so, make a much more radical statement. Copyleft licenses establish an irrevocable state of public access to licensed works. All uses—including modifications and derivative works—are subject to the original licensing terms, and are thus permanently ‘free.’ The effect is a different kind of ‘death of the author’—the author is legally required at the outset, since only the author has the right to license the work in the first place; but once licensed, the author becomes effectively invisible from a rights standpoint. The work’s own license terms are self-sufficient, and the design of the license prevents the work from ever being effectively re-licensed or revoked (FSF FAQ). It is this self-governing move that gives the GNU license its apparently scary anti-commercial aura.

Copyleft thus achieves a different kind of “commons” than most of the Creative Commons licenses. Without consigning works to the post-copyright afterlife of the Public Domain, copyleft effectively establishes an intellectual commons, a domain of free public access and use. Most of the Creative Commons licenses, while invoking a ‘commons’ in name, fall short of this by preserving the controlling right of the author. The fences remain the salient feature of the landscape, regardless of the “free-for-all” license on any given plot.

What difference does this make, though? Arguably, the attribution-centric approach of the Creative Commons has been enormously successful. As of June 2010, the photo-sharing site Flickr.com reported over 145 million CC-licensed photos. While this certainly has implications for stock agency businesses, and while Flickr-sourced photos now commonly adorn everything from Powerpoint presentations to wedding invitations, we should still ask whether Flickr constitutes a commons in any meaningful sense. To be more precise, the largest category of CC-licensed Flickr photos (over 44 million images) invokes both the
“non-commercial” and “no-derivatives” options.

By comparison, Wikipedia is a collaborative project which looks much more like a working commons: by mandating a core copyleft license for all contributions —originally the GNU Free Documentation License, but since June of 2009 the GPL-like CC-SA (share-alike) license—the project has ensured that all contributions are unencumbered by property right restrictions. While individual, fine-grained contributions and edits—located not so much within a particular article as within a revision history—may be (at least pseudonymously) attributed if the contributor takes the trouble to register and log in, the vast majority of contributions have been de-facto anonymous (Anthony, Smith, & Williamson 2007).

In practice, Wikipedia’s authorship is almost entirely effaced—something which has invited heaps of scorn from those critics who hold authorship to be central to trustworthiness (e.g., McHenry 2004). But those criticisms, dramatic though they may be, do not make so much as a dent in the popularity and sheer usefulness—not to mention general accuracy—of Wikipedia. Wikipedia is an example of a successful creative project which is simply not about authors; rather, its success may even be despite them, as the complete absence of fences encourages the incremental, often casual contribution of an indeterminate number of indeterminately interested people. This is the opposite of gridlock; it is an environment that actively encourages contributions on a variety of levels.

Wikipedia has presumably inherited its tradition of anonymous contribution from its underlying software architecture. The original WikiWikiWeb (Portland Pattern Repository) in existence since 1995, was created as a means of collecting descriptions of software design patterns (Cunningham & Venners 2003) and simply had no means of user registration or login. Since the user community it served was originally quite small and a good deal of the spirit of this community was centred around the elaboration of a collaborative process of agile software development (see Beck 2000), the WikiWikiWeb simply put the issue of authorship and rights second to the production of the community, relying when pressed on the assumed goodwill and mutual respect of participants and on vague references to “fair use.” Far short of a policy, an appeal to the virtue of “EgolessWiki” is referenced in several places in the work.

Even more intriguingly, the WikiWikiWeb discourse maintains a distinction between “ThreadMode” and “DocumentMode,” where

DocumentMode is when a Wiki contribution is written in the third person and left unsigned. The piece of text is community property; it may have multiple and changing authors as it is updated to reflect the community consensus. This is in contrast to ThreadMode,
comments which are usually signed and in the first person, and rarely edited by people other than the one who signed them. (Portland Pattern Repository: DocumentMode)

ThreadMode, “a form of discussion where our community holds a conversation,” encourages contributors to “sign” their comments. It is interesting to note that in this distinction, attributions of authorship are seen to have value where there is controversy, where there is no agreed-upon consensus, but lose that value once general agreement has been achieved. Here we find echoes of the history of scholarly communication. Guédon (2001) noted that the 17th-Century Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London played the role of formal “register” of intellectual work, allowing for the extended, written conversation of scholars responding to one another’s work. This function was not the same thing as copyright—indeed it preceded copyright by at least forty-five years. Guédon tells us that the Phil Trans’ function was to establish “intellectual paternity rights” rather than property rights. Property rights only became important when printers’ and publishers’ interests began to be negotiated.

More broadly put, science and academia, which have long legitimized themselves by appealing to the public good, have traditionally relied on an unbundling of authorship and property rights. Far from tying authorship to reproduction and usage rights, science and scholarship have flourished by making the latter as open as practically possible, while retaining attribution as a means of organizing and recognizing the community of participants. Science Commons’ John Wilbanks notes that this allows for a degree of localized convention:

> Requesting behavior, such as citation, through norms and terms of use rather than as a legal requirement based on copyright or contracts, allows for different scientific disciplines to develop different norms for citation. (Wilbanks 2008: 5)

In this context, Wilbanks’ warnings of the dangers of over-application of attribution do make a radical break with established practice; they serve to show how scholarship need not be a slave to intellectual property regimes. Even when the ideals of such a regime are openness and access, the architecture of the regime may lead to unanticipated constraint, so it is our responsibility to pay attention not only to the license terms, but also the infrastructure upon which the license relies. Let us pay attention to the fences, not just the land they enclose.

**Dealing ‘Fairly’**

*Fair* is surely a concept that is justified and rationalized locally, with respect to actual practice, and with reference to the various axes upon which a given situation turns. Fairness may not actually be capturable in a definitive,
encompassing (statutory) statement, neither of exception nor of privilege. The anthropologist and Creative Commons advisor Christopher Kelty (2004) has noted that finely attuned cultural sensibilities cannot be captured entirely in law; rather, functional laws often need to be loose enough for actual communities to interpret and apply in consideration of local situation. Kelty argues that at some point, the legal side must “punt to culture,” thereby granting to communities of practice some scope in the judgement of what is and is not possible:

Rather than make more law, or call in the police, the license strategy relies on “culture” to fill in the gaps with people’s own understandings of what is right and wrong, beyond the law. (2004: 553)

We have any number of examples of distinct communities of practice: in the norms of organized academic disciplines, in both their productive research communities and their pedagogical facets. We see online peer production communities of practice from Flickr.com to free software and from the WikiWikiWeb to its massively scaled-up offspring, Wikipedia—and now, it appears, in a codified form for Science Commons (Science Commons 2007). It is arguable that practices such as peer-to-peer file sharing may reveal “local” norms and customs that are worthy of such consideration. These community understandings of the ‘logic of practice’ operate in addition to (and clearly sometimes even trumping) the copyright legislation and jurisprudence.

In academia and in most organized contexts, we operate with a set of expectations that guide our practical activities and judgments. Those expectations and local conventions ought to be the foundation for legal articulations of rights and licenses in a world where copyright concerns the everyday actions of millions of citizens. In such a scenario, “fair” dealing would be the starting point of the law, rather than its after-the-fact exception. Wilbanks appeals to a sense of goodwill:

If we abandon the idea of the “bad actor” and the concomitant requirement to constantly pursue and prosecute, we can articulate methods that reward the good actor—the person who obeys the norms. (Wilbanks 2008: 8)

Such an approach requires that we abandon all-in-one approaches, either in the attempt to comprehensively rationalize who owns what and under what terms, or to more perfectly delineate exceptions to the rules. What is missing from a great deal of the debate about copyright in the 21st century is that which Lessig raises in “For the Love of Culture”: what kind of world do we want to live in? But where Lessig’s target is the ill-conceived Google Book Settlement—which seeks to do the right thing by all the wrong means—there is surely an opportunity at hand to
think about copyright, fair dealing, and the public domain in a way that does justice to the world our children and grandchildren will inherit. This is a world, I dearly hope, where everything isn’t nailed down, indexed, and registered to infinity; where there is still a good deal of fair ‘play’ in our systems, of commerce, cultural exchange, art and expression. Where there is still room for local interpretation, on-the-fly navigation, and creative negotiation, there is still room to breathe.

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